Status: the tooling in tools/trust/ is implemented and tested with throw-away keys. The real release key does not exist yet; the
key ceremony below is a later step and is written down so that it can be reviewed first. Until it has happened, no artifact is
described as "signed by Barnyard Greens LLC" anywhere.
The Aster Runtime is licensed under the Aster Runtime EULA (publisher: Barnyard Greens LLC); its source code is private. You can check a release without the source: the file list is hashed in SHA256SUMS, the hashes are signed, and the release ships build provenance, a software bill of materials and a licence inventory. Support terms, if any, are separate from the licence (to be decided).
1. What a release contains
| file | what it is |
|---|---|
libaster_runtime.so / .dll / .dylib, aster, aster_web.wasm | the shipped binaries (the C ABI library, the CLI, the browser target) |
SHA256SUMS | sha256 of every file in the release |
SHA256SUMS.minisig | detached minisign signature over SHA256SUMS (one signature covers every file) |
sbom/*.cdx.json | CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM per Cargo workspace (tools/trust/sbom.sh) |
vex/aster.openvex.json, vex/aster.cdx-vex.json | VEX: exploitability statements for every RustSec advisory that matches our dependencies (tools/trust/audit.sh) |
provenance.intoto.json (+ .minisig) | SLSA v1 build provenance for the binaries (tools/trust/provenance.sh) |
licenses.md, licenses.json | licence inventory (tools/trust/licenses.sh) |
2. How to verify a release yourself
You need sha256sum, minisign (https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) and jq.
The public key comes from a channel that is not the download (section 4). The examples use aster-release.pub.
# 1. integrity: every file matches the signed list
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
# 2. authenticity: the list was signed by the Aster release key
minisign -V -p aster-release.pub -m SHA256SUMS # prints: Signature and comment signature verified
# 3. provenance: the binary you hold is the subject of the signed provenance
minisign -V -p aster-release.pub -m provenance.intoto.json
jq -r '.subject[] | "\(.digest.sha256) \(.name)"' provenance.intoto.json | sha256sum -c
jq '.predicate.buildDefinition.externalParameters.source, .predicate.runDetails.builder.id' provenance.intoto.json
# 4. what is inside: components, hashes, licences, known advisories
jq '.components | length' sbom/native.cdx.json
jq -r '.components[] | select(.name=="winit") | .name, .version, .hashes[0].content' sbom/native.cdx.json
jq '.statements | length' vex/aster.openvex.jsonA failed step must be treated as "do not install": report it to [email protected].
Release signatures are minisign signatures.
3. How we check our own builds
We are working toward comparing two builds of each release; this is not yet shown. Because the source is private, we do not publish rebuild instructions. Independent rebuilds are not supported.
4. The release key and the ceremony (not yet performed)
Algorithm: Ed25519 (minisign format). Rationale: small, widely implemented, offline-verifiable, no PKI to operate.
Ceremony (to be done once, by two named people, then recorded in docs/trust/keys/CEREMONY-<date>.md):
- Offline machine (no network, fresh OS, or a live USB). Two people present; neither works alone.
minisign -G -p aster-release.pub -s aster-release.keywith a strong passphrase generated by a password generator, split between the two custodians (each knows half) or stored sealed.- Print the fingerprint (the 8-byte key id in the public key, plus
sha256sum aster-release.pub) on paper and photograph neither. - Encrypted backups of
aster-release.keyon two removable media in two physically separate locations (safe, safe-deposit box). The key is never stored on a networked machine, never in git (tools/trust/.gitignoreandsign.shboth refuse), never in CI secrets in clear text. Preferred: generate the key on a hardware token (YubiKey / OpenSSHed25519-sk) so it cannot be copied; thesshmethod ofsign.shalready supports such keys. - Sign a test file, verify it on a different machine with only the public key, then publish.
- Publish the public key in three independent places so that tampering with one is visible: (a) in the release bundle and on the Trust Center page, (b) the trust website at
https://to be decided/trust/release-keytogether with the fingerprint, (c) the customer contract / onboarding pack (fingerprint printed). A fingerprint mismatch between any two is treated as an incident. Fingerprint:to be decided(placeholder until the ceremony). - Rotation: yearly, and immediately on any suspected exposure. A rotation announcement is signed with the old key and the new key. Revocation: a signed notice on the trust website and to customers by email; old releases stay verifiable with the old key. Releases are never re-signed silently.
- Dev/test keys (throw-away keys made by tests and
check.sh) are generated in a temp directory, never committed, and can never be mistaken for the release key because their fingerprint is not published.
5. Making a release (procedure)
git checkout <tag> # clean tree, tag is signed by a maintainer
tools/trust/check.sh # sbom, licences, deny, audit, vet, repro, provenance, signing self-test
cd tools/trust/out && sha256sum repro/artifacts/* sbom/*.json vex/*.json licenses/* > SHA256SUMS
tools/trust/provenance.sh --out provenance.intoto.json repro/artifacts/* # SLSA v1 statement
tools/trust/sign.sh --key /path/to/aster-release.key SHA256SUMS provenance.intoto.json # prompts for the passphrase
tools/trust/verify.sh --pub docs/trust/keys/aster-release.pub SHA256SUMS provenance.intoto.json # never ship without thisThe release is not published if check.sh exits non-zero or if any step above fails.
6. Which SLSA level this is, honestly
SLSA v1.0 Build track (https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/levels):
| level | requirement | Aster today |
|---|---|---|
| Build L1 | provenance exists, says how the artifact was built | Reached. provenance.sh emits an in-toto/SLSA v1 statement: source commit, command, lockfile hashes, vendored-crate tree hash, docker image id as the build environment. |
| Build L2 | hosted build platform generates and signs the provenance; consumers can verify it | Not reached. The provenance is produced by a script run by the operator and signed by the operator's key. That is stronger than nothing (it is signed and tamper-evident) but the same people who can alter the build can alter the provenance. L2 needs a hosted build service (CI) that holds the signing identity and produces the statement itself. |
| Build L3 | hardened platform: isolated, ephemeral builds; signing material not accessible to the build steps; provenance unforgeable by the tenant | Not reached. Needs an isolated, ephemeral builder (one container/VM per build, no shared state, no network except a pinned fetch), the signing key held by the platform outside the build's reach (or keyless, e.g. a transparency log), and a second party who can verify. |
Also open: the build runs on a host we operate, so the builder.id is a placeholder URI (https://aster.invalid/builders/...)
until the real builder identity is fixed; and the provenance is a bare in-toto statement signed as a file, not yet wrapped in a DSSE
envelope. Signed provenance and the SBOM are what we offer today; a second party cannot recompute the bytes because the source is private.
7. Placeholders in this document
to be decided, to be decided, to be decided: to be filled by the publisher (the security contact is [email protected]); nothing
here invents a contact, address or price.