A draft mapping of NIST SP 800-218 (SSDF v1.1) practices to what Aster does today, with gaps stated, and a draft of the CISA secure software development attestation. DRAFT. Not submitted. Not signed.
Statuses: Met = we do it and can point at evidence; Partial = done in part; Gap = not done; N/A = does not apply. Evidence paths marked (planned) do not exist yet. A self-assessment by the developer, without third-party review.
Sources: NIST SP 800-218, Secure Software Development Framework v1.1 (https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final); CISA Secure Software Development Attestation Form (https://www.cisa.gov/secure-software-attestation-form).
Mapping
PO: Prepare the organization
| Practice | Status | What we do / evidence |
|---|---|---|
| PO.1 Define security requirements for software development, communicate them | Partial | Rules in CONTRIBUTING.md, no-I/O rule in No data: what Aster does and does not do, unsafe rule in Unsafe code policy and inventory (planned). No formal requirements document for third-party-supplied software |
| PO.2 Roles and responsibilities, training | Partial | Roles named by function in Vulnerability handling policy. One human maintainer. No formal training records: Gap |
| PO.3 Supporting toolchains | Met | Pinned toolchain image, cargo fmt, clippy -D warnings, tests, the I/O guard (tools/trust/no-io-check.sh); supply-chain tooling (Supply chain: SBOM, licences, advisories, vetting, reproducibility, planned) |
| PO.4 Define and use security checks in the process | Met | Gates in CONTRIBUTING.md; guard test rust/crates/aster-appkit/tests/no_io_default_build.rs |
| PO.5 Implement and maintain secure environments for development | Partial | Builds run in containers on a LAN host, protected main. No formal environment hardening document or access review: Gap |
PS: Protect the software
| Practice | Status | What we do / evidence |
|---|---|---|
| PS.1 Protect all forms of code from unauthorized access and tampering | Partial | Server-side pre-receive hook protects main; development host is privately operated; the source repository is private; the SDK repository, when public, is read-only for outsiders. Single-owner write access; no two-person rule: Gap. Release checks: Verifying a release |
| PS.2 Provide a mechanism to verify software release integrity | Partial | Signed releases and checksums (Releases: signing, provenance and verification, planned) |
| PS.3 Archive and protect each release; collect provenance data | Partial | Git history, SBOM and provenance per release (Supply chain: SBOM, licences, advisories, vetting, reproducibility, planned) |
PW: Produce well-secured software
| Practice | Status | What we do / evidence |
|---|---|---|
| PW.1 Design software to meet security requirements, assess risks | Partial | Design by construction: no data, no network in default build, unsafe_code = forbid in core crates (rust/Cargo.toml). No formal threat model document: Gap |
| PW.2 Review the design for compliance | Gap | No independent design review process recorded |
| PW.4 Reuse existing, well-secured software; verify third-party components | Met (planned tooling) | Few dependencies; allowlist enforced by the guard. License and advisory scanning in Supply chain: SBOM, licences, advisories, vetting, reproducibility |
| PW.5 Create source code following secure coding practices | Met | Memory-safe language; unsafe forbidden in core; lints with warnings denied |
| PW.6 Configure compilation and build processes to improve security | Partial | Release profile, locked dependencies (Cargo.lock), reproducible build work in Releases: signing, provenance and verification (planned) |
| PW.7 Review and/or analyze human-readable code | Partial | Review branches and independent review pass (Provenance and AI use). One human reviewer: Gap |
| PW.8 Test executable code | Partial | Extensive automated tests, including oracle comparisons and gates in rust/crates/*/tests; fuzzing in Fuzzing (planned) |
| PW.9 Configure software to have secure settings by default | Met | Default build is I/O-free; I/O features are off by default (No data: what Aster does and does not do) |
RV: Respond to vulnerabilities
| Practice | Status | What we do / evidence |
|---|---|---|
| RV.1 Identify and confirm vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis | Partial | Intake in Security policy; dependency advisory scanning and fuzzing planned |
| RV.2 Assess, prioritize and remediate | Partial | Process and CVSS 4.0 scoring in Vulnerability handling policy. Not yet exercised on a real report |
| RV.3 Analyze vulnerabilities to identify root causes | Partial | Post-release review step in the process. Not yet exercised |
Draft attestation (not submitted)
CISA's form (OMB control number 1670-0052) is used by software producers selling to US federal agencies; the requirement and the form have been revised since 2022, so check the current text and whether any customer asks for it before use. The draft below follows its structure and is not an attestation; an authorized company officer must review, correct and sign, and a false statement can carry legal consequences. Several statements cannot be made today (see "cannot attest yet").
Section I. Producer: Barnyard Greens LLC (Pennsylvania). Address, contact and signatory: to be decided (not filled in).
Section II. Software: Aster UI (core crates and aster-appkit), version to be decided. Release date to be decided.
Section III. Attestation statements (draft)
| # | Statement in the form (paraphrased) | Draft answer | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Software developed and built in secure development environments: separated and protected, access logged and reviewed, MFA where feasible, minimal trust, encrypted data, secrets protected, regular monitoring | Cannot attest yet | Environments are containerized and branch-protected, but access control review, MFA evidence and logging are not documented (PS.1, PO.5 gaps) |
| 2 | Producer makes good-faith efforts to maintain trusted source code supply chains: automated tools to review third-party components, controls on trusted sources, inventory | Can attest once Supply chain: SBOM, licences, advisories, vetting, reproducibility tooling is running | Allowlist guard exists today; scanning planned |
| 3 | Producer maintains provenance for internally developed code and third-party components, updated as components change | Can attest once SBOM and provenance exist | Releases: signing, provenance and verification, Provenance and AI use |
| 4 | Producer employs automated tools or comparable processes to check for security vulnerabilities, operates them at least on a regular cadence, and maintains a vulnerability disclosure process | Partly: disclosure process defined; automated vulnerability checks planned | Vulnerability handling policy, Fuzzing |
Cannot attest yet: statement 1 in full, and 2-4 until the planned tooling runs. Do not submit until the gaps above are closed or the form is answered with a plan of action and milestones where the form allows it. Not submitted.