Compliance and questionnaires

SSDF mapping and draft attestation

In reviewUpdated 2026-11-15Trust Center

In review. This record, and the tools and files it cites, are on a review branch. They are not in the main source tree yet, so you cannot check them in a copy of the main source today.

A draft mapping of NIST SP 800-218 (SSDF v1.1) practices to what Aster does today, with gaps stated, and a draft of the CISA secure software development attestation. DRAFT. Not submitted. Not signed.

Statuses: Met = we do it and can point at evidence; Partial = done in part; Gap = not done; N/A = does not apply. Evidence paths marked (planned) do not exist yet. A self-assessment by the developer, without third-party review.

Sources: NIST SP 800-218, Secure Software Development Framework v1.1 (https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final); CISA Secure Software Development Attestation Form (https://www.cisa.gov/secure-software-attestation-form).

Mapping

PO: Prepare the organization

PracticeStatusWhat we do / evidence
PO.1 Define security requirements for software development, communicate themPartialRules in CONTRIBUTING.md, no-I/O rule in No data: what Aster does and does not do, unsafe rule in Unsafe code policy and inventory (planned). No formal requirements document for third-party-supplied software
PO.2 Roles and responsibilities, trainingPartialRoles named by function in Vulnerability handling policy. One human maintainer. No formal training records: Gap
PO.3 Supporting toolchainsMetPinned toolchain image, cargo fmt, clippy -D warnings, tests, the I/O guard (tools/trust/no-io-check.sh); supply-chain tooling (Supply chain: SBOM, licences, advisories, vetting, reproducibility, planned)
PO.4 Define and use security checks in the processMetGates in CONTRIBUTING.md; guard test rust/crates/aster-appkit/tests/no_io_default_build.rs
PO.5 Implement and maintain secure environments for developmentPartialBuilds run in containers on a LAN host, protected main. No formal environment hardening document or access review: Gap

PS: Protect the software

PracticeStatusWhat we do / evidence
PS.1 Protect all forms of code from unauthorized access and tamperingPartialServer-side pre-receive hook protects main; development host is privately operated; the source repository is private; the SDK repository, when public, is read-only for outsiders. Single-owner write access; no two-person rule: Gap. Release checks: Verifying a release
PS.2 Provide a mechanism to verify software release integrityPartialSigned releases and checksums (Releases: signing, provenance and verification, planned)
PS.3 Archive and protect each release; collect provenance dataPartialGit history, SBOM and provenance per release (Supply chain: SBOM, licences, advisories, vetting, reproducibility, planned)

PW: Produce well-secured software

PracticeStatusWhat we do / evidence
PW.1 Design software to meet security requirements, assess risksPartialDesign by construction: no data, no network in default build, unsafe_code = forbid in core crates (rust/Cargo.toml). No formal threat model document: Gap
PW.2 Review the design for complianceGapNo independent design review process recorded
PW.4 Reuse existing, well-secured software; verify third-party componentsMet (planned tooling)Few dependencies; allowlist enforced by the guard. License and advisory scanning in Supply chain: SBOM, licences, advisories, vetting, reproducibility
PW.5 Create source code following secure coding practicesMetMemory-safe language; unsafe forbidden in core; lints with warnings denied
PW.6 Configure compilation and build processes to improve securityPartialRelease profile, locked dependencies (Cargo.lock), reproducible build work in Releases: signing, provenance and verification (planned)
PW.7 Review and/or analyze human-readable codePartialReview branches and independent review pass (Provenance and AI use). One human reviewer: Gap
PW.8 Test executable codePartialExtensive automated tests, including oracle comparisons and gates in rust/crates/*/tests; fuzzing in Fuzzing (planned)
PW.9 Configure software to have secure settings by defaultMetDefault build is I/O-free; I/O features are off by default (No data: what Aster does and does not do)

RV: Respond to vulnerabilities

PracticeStatusWhat we do / evidence
RV.1 Identify and confirm vulnerabilities on an ongoing basisPartialIntake in Security policy; dependency advisory scanning and fuzzing planned
RV.2 Assess, prioritize and remediatePartialProcess and CVSS 4.0 scoring in Vulnerability handling policy. Not yet exercised on a real report
RV.3 Analyze vulnerabilities to identify root causesPartialPost-release review step in the process. Not yet exercised

Draft attestation (not submitted)

CISA's form (OMB control number 1670-0052) is used by software producers selling to US federal agencies; the requirement and the form have been revised since 2022, so check the current text and whether any customer asks for it before use. The draft below follows its structure and is not an attestation; an authorized company officer must review, correct and sign, and a false statement can carry legal consequences. Several statements cannot be made today (see "cannot attest yet").

Section I. Producer: Barnyard Greens LLC (Pennsylvania). Address, contact and signatory: to be decided (not filled in).

Section II. Software: Aster UI (core crates and aster-appkit), version to be decided. Release date to be decided.

Section III. Attestation statements (draft)

#Statement in the form (paraphrased)Draft answerBasis
1Software developed and built in secure development environments: separated and protected, access logged and reviewed, MFA where feasible, minimal trust, encrypted data, secrets protected, regular monitoringCannot attest yetEnvironments are containerized and branch-protected, but access control review, MFA evidence and logging are not documented (PS.1, PO.5 gaps)
2Producer makes good-faith efforts to maintain trusted source code supply chains: automated tools to review third-party components, controls on trusted sources, inventoryCan attest once Supply chain: SBOM, licences, advisories, vetting, reproducibility tooling is runningAllowlist guard exists today; scanning planned
3Producer maintains provenance for internally developed code and third-party components, updated as components changeCan attest once SBOM and provenance existReleases: signing, provenance and verification, Provenance and AI use
4Producer employs automated tools or comparable processes to check for security vulnerabilities, operates them at least on a regular cadence, and maintains a vulnerability disclosure processPartly: disclosure process defined; automated vulnerability checks plannedVulnerability handling policy, Fuzzing

Cannot attest yet: statement 1 in full, and 2-4 until the planned tooling runs. Do not submit until the gaps above are closed or the form is answered with a plan of action and milestones where the form allows it. Not submitted.

Source docs/trust/SSDF-ATTESTATION.mdlast changed 2026-11-15

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